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LABOR LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS-
INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYER
DOES NOT PER SE VIOLATE N.L.R.A.
In an unfair labor practice proceeding, the complaint alleged that
the employer engaged in sexually discriminatory wage treatment of
his employees, and that such conduct per se violated sections
8(a)(1)1 and (3)2of the National Labor Relations Act (cited here-
inafter NLRA). Finding it unnecessary to resolve the factual issue,3
the National Labor Relations Board went beyond the narrow ques-
tion presented to hold generally that discrimination based on sex,
race, religion, or national origin, without more, is not "inherently
destructive" 4 of employees' section 7 rights and thus does not vio-
l. Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by [Sec-
tion 71 -..
Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection....
2. Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization.
3. The majority did reach the issue of the employer's alleged refusal to bargain on the
issue of discrimination -a recognized Section 8(a)(5) violation-and found that no such
refusal existed. 82 L.R.R.M. at 1485. Member Fanning, concurring, resolved all factual
issues against the petitioner and thus did not reach the legal issues. Id. Member Jenkins, in
dissent, would have resolved all factual and legal issues in favor of the petitioner. Id., at
1486.
4. By the phrase "inherently destructive," the Board invokes the test for finding per se
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) without a showing of unlawful anti-union motivation;
an employer is "held to intend the very consequences which foreseeably and inescapably
flow from his actions." NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 at 228-29 (1963). Under
the Court's most recent formulation of this doctrine:
If it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct
was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of anti-
union motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice
even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by
business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory
conduct on employee rights is "comparatively slight," an anti-union motiva-
tion must be proven to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward
with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the con-
duct. Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer
engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected em-
ployee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish
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late sections 8(a)(1) or (3). For invidious discrimination to violate
the Act, there must be "actual evidence" of interference with the
rights of employees. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82
L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).5
The Board specifically refused to acquiesce in the novel doctrine
of United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB6 , that an employer's dis-
crimination based on race or national origin violates section 8(a)(1)
because
(1) racial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of interests be-
tween groups of workers which tends to reduce the likelihood and
the effectiveness of their working in concert to achieve their legit-
imate goals under the Act; and (2) racial discrimination creates in its
victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting
their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination. We find
that the confluence of these two facts sufficiently deters the exercise
of Section 7 rights as to violate Section 8(a)(1).7 (emphasis sup-
plied)
In rejecting this Packinghouse rationale, the Board adhered to its
prior holdings and refused to extend its influence in the area of
invidious discrimination by employers. It thus limited the prolifer-
ation of remedies for employment discrimination that has concerned
writers8 and members of Congress,9 but did little to clarify the
overall picture.
that he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is
most accessible to him. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34
(1967)
The Board thus failed to apply the second part of the two-tier test; had it found that racial
discrimination must always harm employee rights to some extent, the employer would then
have been required to show legitimate motivation. But see text accompanying note 53 infra.
5. Fanning, member, concurring; Jenkins, member, dissenting.
6. 41.6 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, C. J.) cert. denied 396 U.S. 903 (1969) noted in
57 Geo. L. Rev. 1313 (1969), 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 855 (1969), and 23 Vand. L. Rev. 867
(1970). See also Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), decided after the principal case, but citing with approval the Packinghouse
decision (in dicta) without mentioning the principal case.
7. 416 F.2d at 1135 (emphasis in original).
8. See, e.g., Alleyne, Legal Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment, 2 Black
L. J. 282 (1972); Beaird, Racial Discrimination in Employment Rights and Remedies, 6 Ga.
L. Rev. 469 (1972); Bloch, Race Discrimination in Industry and the Grievance Process, 21
Lab. L. J. 627 (1970); Boyce, Racial Discrymination and the National Labor Relations Act,
65 Nw. U. L. Rev. 232 (1970); Farmer,
Chaotic Administration, 44 Fla. B. J. 400 (1970); Gould, The Emerging Law Against Racial
Discrimination in Employment, 64 Nw. U. L Rev. 359 (1969); Gould, Racial Equality in
Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Burger Court, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 237 (1969);
Herbert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating Employment
Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 449 (1971); Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping
and Conflicting Remedies to Employment Discrimination, 39 U. Chi. L Rev. 30 (1971);
Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of
Forums, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 455 (1971); Silberman, The Search for an Effective Remedy in
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Under present law, victims of discrimination may seek relief under
state Fair Employment Practices laws,' 0 the Civil Rights Act of
1866,11 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"2 as amended
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.13 The position
of the NLRA in the area, however, has been ambiguous. In large part
the ambiguity is due to the separate treatment under the Act of
invidious discrimination by unions and employers. Courts have long
recognized for unions a "duty of fair representation ' 1 4 correlative
to their position as exclusive bargaining representative.' s The Board
has enforced this duty by withholding certification from unions that
discriminate,' 6 and by refusing to apply the contract bar rule to
labor agreements with discriminatory provisions.' 7 Recently, in fact,
the Supreme Court settled the principle that breach of the duty is an
unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1) of the Act.1 ' Further-
more, an employer may violate sections 8(a)(1) and (3)' 9 by partic-
ipating in invidious discrimination in concert with a union.
Until Packinghouse, however, neither the Board nor the courts had
been willing to reason that since discrimination by an employer in
concert with a union violates the Act, such discrimination by an
Employment Discrimination, Proc. 23d N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. Lab 133 (1971); Sovern, The
National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 Colum. L Rev. 563 (1962); M.
Sovern, Legal Restraints on Racial Discrimination in Employment, 73 (1966); Note, Allo-
cating Jurisdiction over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB: A Proposal, 54 Cornell
L. Q. 943 (1965); Note, Implementing Governmental Policy Against RacialDiscrimination
in Employment: Fair Employment Practices Laws, Title VII, National Labor Relations Act,
and the Philadelphia Plan, 23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 157 (1970).
9. See 118 Cong. Rec. 3172 (1972) (remarks of Senator Hruska); but see 118 Cong. Rec.
3369 (1972) (remarks of Senator Javits).
10. See Note, Implementing Governmental Policy Against Racial Discrimination in Em-
ployment: Fair Employment Practices Laws, Title VII, National Labor Relations Act, and
the Philadelphia Plan, 23 U. Fla. L Rev. 157, 158-162 (1970); BNA Fair Employment
Practices Manual 451: 26-27 (1972).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), by analogy to the principle announced in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See Note, Racial Discrimination in Employment and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 615 (1969), and Macklin v. Spector Freight
Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
12. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
13. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 amending 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-2000e-15
(1970).
14. The duty was first recognized in Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)
under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 151-62 (1970). It was subsequently applied to
cases arising under the NLRA. Syres v. Oil Workers, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
15. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
16. See e.g Larus & Bros., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
17. Pioneer Bus. Co., 140 N.LR.B. 54 (1962).
18. The Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1972), endorsed the Board's holding to
this effect in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.LR.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963). See also, Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (15th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
19. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185-86 (1962).
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employer acting alone violates the Act as well.2 0 On the other hand,
an employer's discriminatory pronouncements that may inflame ra-
cial feelings are grounds for setting aside an election,
2 1 and sexually
discriminatory action that by its peculiar circumstances could have
the foreseeable consequence of encouraging or discouraging union
membership violates section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 22 Furthermore,
since such discrimination clearly affects "terms and conditions of
employment," 2  concerted activity to eliminate it is protected,
2
and a refusal to bargain on the subject violates section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.2 s
In refusing to extend existing NLRA remedies for employment
discrimination, the Board in the instant case, did not decide whether
discrimination had in fact occurred,2 6 issuing, in effect, an advisory
opinion binding on the parties and with the force of precedent. As to
the legal issue, it rejected the Packinghouse formulation 2 , as indi-
cating merely possible effects of invidious discrimination.
2 8 nstead,
the Board required
actual evidence, as opposed to speculation of a nexus between the
alleged discriminatory conduct and the interference with, or re-
straint of, employees in the exercise of those rights protected by the
Act.
2 9
In rejecting the per se rule, however, the board emphasized as it had
in earlier cases 3 " that invidious discrimination by employers that has
20. See text accompanying note 45.
21. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
22. Edmund A. Gray Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 590 (1963).
23. NLRA Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No.
2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1485 (1973).
24. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969); Western Addition Com-
munity Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25. See e.g. Farmer's Cooperative Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290 (1968), enforcement
granted this ground, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair practice
for an employer
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of (Section 9(a) of the Act).
26. While we have serious doubts about the validity of the Administrative Law
Judge's finding of nondiscrimination, we find it unnecessary to resolve this
question, for in our view, discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.., is not violative of Section (sic) 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
82 L.R.R.M. at 1484 (1973) Member Fanning, concurring, resolved all factual issues against
the union and (implicitly) criticized the majority for stating "a legal conclusion ... (that is)
at best, mere dicta," 82 L.R.R.M. at 1486 (1973).
27. See text accompanying note 7, supra.
28. 82 L.R.R.M. 1484 (1973).
29. Id.
30. See notes 20 and 25, supra.
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a necessary relation to the Board's proper function may violate the
Act.
What should be the treatment of invidious discrimination by em-
ployers under the NLRA? The treshold policy question of whether
another agency should oust the board's jurisdiction in the area seems
to turn on the effectiveness of remedies under Title VII. 3 1 Prior to
1972, the EEOC had no enforcement powers,32 and legislative his-
tory33 as well as policy considerations suggested that courts should
not limit existing remedies 3  since other forums provided more ef-
fective relief. One writer went so far as to question, in light of the
rule announced in Packinghouse, the justification for the EEOC's
continued existence without "cease and desist" powers. 3 I The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 19723 6 attempted to meet the
need by granting the EEOC power to enforce its orders through
judicial process. 3 7 Contrary to its original purpose, 3 ' however, it did
not grant power to issue cease and desist orders. As a result, by way
of compromise, all existing remedies were specifically left intact.3"
Congressional intent is thus clear: the present proliferation of rem-
31. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970). Some writers favor unification of remedies,
but on the condition that the agency given exclusive jurisdiction also be given adequate
enforcement powers. Alternatively, they argue, agencies should coordinate their efforts and
apply principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Beaird, Racial Discrimination in
Employment: Rights and Remedies, 6 Ga. L. Rev. 469, 487 (1972); Farmer, Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity-Case Study of Chaotic Administration, 44 Fla. B. J. 400, 403 (1970);
Note, Implementing Governmental Policy Against Racial Discrimination in Employment:
Fair Employment Practices Laws, Title VII, National Labor Relations Act, and the Philadel-
phia Plan, 23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 157 (1970). One writer favors retention by the Board of those
powers "essential to (its) duty of administering the LMRA," Note, Allocating Jurisdiction
Over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and the NLRB: A Proposal, 54 Cornell L Rev. 943,
955 (1969), or, in effect, all those existing prior to Packinghouse. See text accompanying
notes 17-21, supra. The Packinghouse remedy, he argues, should be allocated to a strength-
ened EEOC. Id. at 956.
32. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, Title VII, R 705(a)-(d), (f)-(j), 78 Stat. 258,
259.
33. See 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964) (Letter from Justice Department read by Senator
Clark), 110 Cong. Rec. 13650-52 (1964) (Tower amendment that would have made EEOC
exclusive remedy rejected by vote of 59 to 29).
34. In fact, courts did not. See, e.g. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
1126, 1133, note 11 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1966).
35. Sovern, An Overview of Equal Employment Opportunity, unpublished paper read to
1969 symposium sponsored by ABA Section of Labor Relations, quoted in Meltzer, Labor
Law, Cases, Materials and Problems 910-911 (1970).
36. U.S.C. § § 2000e-2000e-15.
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (Supp. 1970-72).
38. "The basic purpose of H.R. 1746 is to grant the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission authority to issue, through well established procedures, judicially enforceable
cease and desist orders." H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. and Adm. News 2137.
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(e) (Supp. 1970-1972).
May 19741 LABOR LAW
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
edies, 4 0 including the union's duty of fair representation under the
NLRA,4 1 should continue until the EEOC is able to deal with all
aspects of the problem. One could argue, in fact, that Congress spe-
cifically intended that the remedy formulated in Packinghouse be
retained.4 2 Even at that, however, certain aspects of the problem
could be allocated between the EEOC and the Board by a consistent
policy4" to avoid conflicts that would defeat the efforts of both
agencies.4
There remains, then, the legal question-not necessarily separate
from these policy considerations4 I -of whether the NLRA, as
amended, encompasses invidious discrimination by employers acting
alone. The legislative history of the Act certainly does not support
the proposition.4 6 It is true that the same could be said about the
40. Senator Javits, speaking against the Hruska Amendment that would have granted the
EEOC exclusive authority over case of invidious discrimination, read with approval a letter
from the Assistant Attorney General which stated:
Although we favor the granting of judicial enforcement authority to EEOC,
we are concerned at this point in time there be no elimination of any of the
remedies which have achieved some success in the effort to end employment
discrimination ...
At this juncture, when we are all agreed that some improvement in the en-
forcement of Title VII is needed, it would be, in our judgment, unwise to
diminish in any way the variety of enforcement means already available to
deal with discrimination in employment. The problem is widespread and we
suggest that all available resources should be used in the effort to correct it.
118 Cong. Rec. 3369-70 (1972). The Hruska Amendment was rejected first by a vote of 33
to 33, 118 Cong. Rec. 3373 (1972), then, on a vote to reconsider, 50 to 37, 118 Cong. Rec.
§ 1797 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1972).
In the House, the Erlenborn Substitute, containing a little-noticed provision making the
EEOC the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination, was passed by a vote of 202 to
197, 118 Cong. Rec. 32111 (1971), but the Conference Report, adopted by both the
Senate, 118 Cong. Rec. 7170 (1972) (62 for, 10 against), and the House, 118 Cong. Rec.
7573 (1972) (303 for, 110 against), specifically retained all existing remedies. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-16(e) (Supp. 1970-1972).
41. Both Senator Williams, 118 Cong. Rec. 3371 (1972), and Senator Javits, 118 Cong.
Rec. § 1794 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1972), noted the special capabilities of the Board in dealing
with unions.
42. Senator Hruska specifically noted the case and the holding in the course of arguing
that the only reason the EEOC was not the exclusive remedy was that it had no enforce-
ment powers. 118 Cong. Rec. § 1792 (daily ed., Feb. 15, 1972).
43. See note 26, supra.
44. See, e.g., Farmer, Equal Employment Opportunity- Case Study in Chaotic Adminis-
tration, 44 Fla. B.J. 400, 403 (1970).
45. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482. 1487 (Jenkins, member,
dissenting). Cf. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 97 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (concerted activity involving racial discrimination given greater latitude than
other types of concerted activity).
46. "Even its [Packinghouse's] wildest proponents must concede that Congress did not
have racial discrimination in mind when it devised section 8(a)(1)." Boyce, Racial Discrimin-
ation and the NLRA, 65 Nw. U. L. Rev. 232, 256 (1970). Congress has refused specifically
to make racial discrimination an unfair labor practice, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 867, 870, note 16
(1970).
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union's duty of fair representation and few would now doubt itslegitimacy. 4  But, the union's duty is based on sound statutory con-
struction wholly inapplicable to employers. 4 ' To say that an em-ployer discriminating in concert with a union violates the Act does
not imply, despite the suggestions in Packinghouse4 9 and the dissent
in the principal case, 0 that an employer acting alone in his discrim-
inatory conduct therefore violates the Act as well." The Act confers
on the union special responsibilities that the employer, who repre-
sents no one, does not bear.
One may not, therefore, reason over from the duty of fair repre-
sentation to the employer's duty of non-discrimination. There is,however, the independent question of whether invidious discrimin-
ation by an employer either necessarily or under certain circum-
stances amounts to unlawful interference or coercion. The Court in
Packinghouse reached its per se rule by two lines of reasoning. First,
it adopted as a means of statutory construction the psychological
arguments here embodied in Brown v. Board of Education,"2 that
racial discrimination induces feelings of inferiority and docility.5'
47. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
48. ... the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of adesignated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all
members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its dis-
cretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.
Id. at 177.
49. United Packinghouse Workers v. N.LR.B., 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (1969).
50. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 LRRM 1482, 1488 (1973).
51. As the Board pointed out in Miranda Fuel Co.:
[A] labor organization as a statutory bargaining representative is not the same
entity under the statute as an employer; for labor organizations, because theydo represent employees, have statutory obligations to employees which em-
ployers do not." 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the union's duty of fair
representation necessarily implies a duty of non-discrimination for employers:
It is true that in several cases we have held that the exclusive bargaining agents
authorized by the Act must not use their powers to discriminate against
minority groups whom they are supposed to represent. And we have held that
employers too may be enjoined from carrying out provisions of a discrimina-
tory bargaining agreement. But the duty the Act imposes is one of fair repre-
sentation and it is imposed upon the union. The employer is merely prohibitedfrom aiding the union in breaching its duty. Nothing in the Railway Labor Act
or in our cases suggests that the Act places upon an air carrier a duty to engage
only in fair nondiscriminatory hiring practices. Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm. v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 724 (1963).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. The Court quoted with approval the Kansas court's finding that:[S] egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimen-
tal effect on the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects
the motivation of the child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
May 1974]
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The employer thus renders his employees docile and inhibits them
from asserting their section 7 rights.5" Second, the discrimination
divides workers by creating an "unjustified clash of interests," setting
workers against themselves and deflecting them from their common
purpose of self-organization. In answer to the docility argument, one
may say with some force that it is dated,' I that blacks are increas-
ingly militant and may assert their rights even more vigorously in the
face of discrimination.' 6 It is suggested, however, that one cannot
defeat the argument that discrimination divides workers of different
races.' I Although the court in Packinghouse relied so heavily on the
psychological argument that invidious discrimination induces docility
that the opinion may be subject to justifiable criticism, the "clash of
interests" argument, standing alone, may independently support a
per se rule in section 8(a)(1) cases.
Even if invidious discrimination by employers is not "inherently
destructive" of the rights of employees in all circumstances, it may
yet cause "slight harm" in all circumstances. In that case, under the
test set forth in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, I 8 the burden could be
shifted to the employer to show legitimate business motivation." 9
This is similar to the test suggested by one writer
6  that an estab-
therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of
Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive
in a racially integrated school system. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 at
494 (1954).
54. "Self-organization" in Section 7 need not be limited to present efforts, but may also
include a general ability to act concertedly. See, 57 Ceo. L. J. 1313, 1314, n. 13 (1969).
55. Bloch, Race Discrimination in Industry and the Grievance Process, 21 Lab. L. J. 627
(1970).
56. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 92 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1484 (1973).
57. One writer, while refuting the "docility" argument in Packinghouse, unwittingly
reinforced that case's "clash of interest" argument when he wrote:
In 1970 the aggrieved black is not reacting with docility, but, at least, with
vigorous resistance and at times open revolt. He sees the need to organize, but
often feels a certain futility in identifying with the accepted bargaining units.
He is aware that, even when acting in good faith, the employee representatives
may be unable to represent his best interests or successfully deal with the
overwhelming problem peculiar to minority groups. In response, the black
worker has contemplated organizing along racial lines or has at times rejected
the bargaining process in toto ... The union ... is faced with its own in-
abilities to fairly represent black members. Bloch, Race Discrimination in
Industry and the Grievance Process, 21 Lab. L. J. 627, 627-28 (1970).
(Emphasis supplied)
58. 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
59. See note 3, supra. The Court has applied this test in cases involving "discrimination"
and "interference" under sections 8(a)(3) and (1), but in each, the employer's acts were
brought on through the active exercise, by employees, of their section 7 rights. Shieber,
Section 8(a)(3) of The National Labor Relations Act; a Rationale: Part I, Discrimination, 29
a. L Rev. 46, 59, n. 33 (1968). It would thus require a substantial step to find unlawful
interference and discrimination merely from arbitrary actions by an employer not in re-
sponse to any specific protect conduct by employees.
60. 57 Geo. L Rev. 1313, 1319 (1969).
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fished pattern or practice of invidious discrimination has a "natural
tendency" to interfere with section 7 rights and that once the Board
shows such a pattern or practice the employer should be required to
come forward with evidence of the lack of adverse effect on his
employees.
If one concludes, as did the Board in the instant case, that the
mere fact of invidious discrimination carries with it no presumption,
conclusive or otherwise, of adverse effect of section 7 rights, the
question becomes under what circumstances such discrimination
would violate the Act. There are two tests suggested by the majority
opinion in the principal case, but which one the Board intended is
unclear. The first test would require, after the discrimination has
been established, "actual evidence"'" of the adverse effect on the
employee's rights, or "an independent factual determination" of the
harm in each case. 6 2 As a practical matter, under present board
procedures, such a test would be unworkable. As two writers have
recently noted:
Although it has been administering the NLRA for over thirty-five
years, the Board has never engaged in an effort to determine empir-
ically whether a particular type of conduct has a coercive impact.
The Board has not required, or even permitted, the introduction of
evidence as to whether particular conduct had a harmful effect on
employees. 6
3
Furthermore, it seems inappropriate as a matter of policy to require
the petitioner having once established a pattern of discrimination to
then, in all cases, show a harmful effect as well.
More likely, the second, more traditional test suggested in the
Board's opinion was intended. Under this test, once petitioner shows
discrimination, if the particular form of discrimination has the "nec-
essary direct relationship" '64 with the Board's traditional functions,
it violates the Act. The Board here does not determine whether the
employees were actuall harmed, but instead "whether it would be
reasonable to conclude" that the employees rights were violated. 6 1
61. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 LR.R.M. 1482, 1484 (1973).
62. 23 Vand. L. Rev. 867, 873 (1970).
63. Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681,
682 (1972). See also Marshall Field & Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 1 (1941) where the Board stated at
10; that "Evidence concerning the effect or lack of effect of the respondent's conduct on
particular individual is not decisive of" the issue of interference or coercion.
64. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 LR.R.M. 1482, 1484 (1973).
65. 33 NLRB Ann. Rep. 60 (1969). The Board's statement here related to conduct of
elections, but the same techniques apply in unfair labor practice cases. Thus, in Edmund A.
Gray Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 590 (1963), dismissal of all female employees violated sections
8(a)(1) and (3) because the purpose of the discharge was to avoid collective bargaining on
the issue of equal pay; whether employees were actually harmed by the dismissals was not
discussed.
May 19741
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However, since the Board established no guidelines other than
through citation of earlier cases involving discrimination, it is impos-
sible to predict what forms of discriminatory conduct would amount
to interference or coercion. Clear principles rather than consistency
with these prior holdings should be the controlling criteria.
This comment has dealt extensively with methodology since the
Board's opinion in the noted case leaves the issue of invidious dis-
crimination under the NLRA in an unacceptable posture. Further
adjudication is required because the Board's decision in the instant
case is inadequately reasoned, 6 6 too vague to reveal a discernable
test, and, because of the majority's technique, "mere dicta." 6 7 In
the absence of clarifying Congressional action, the Board should de-
termine its jurisdiction over cases of employment discrimination in
light of its own particular areas of influence and with awareness of
the overlapping jurisdictions of other agencies.
WILLIAM H. PAGE
66. The reasons assigned by the Board to refute the arguments set forth in Packinghouse
were taken virtually word for word from a student Note of Packinghouse appearing at 57
Geo. L. J. 1313 (1969). That Note stated at 1318:
In supporting the first "effect" of employer racial discrimination, the court
stated that "the employer's policy of discrimination inevitably sets group
against group, thus frustrating the possibility of effective concerted action."
Although employer discrimination may have this effect, it is by no means
inevitable. It has been demonstrated that a continued practice of discrimina-
tion causes minority groups to coalesce internally, and it is possible that this
could lead to collective action with nonminority group members.
Docility is only one of several possible consequences of an employer's racial
discrimination. In light of the increased militancy of minority groups today,
both on a local and a national level, it seems inevitable that minority groups in
different areas of the country will react dissimilarly to discriminatory prac-
tices.
Compare the language of the Board's opinion, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482, at 1484:
Although employer discrimination may have the effect of setting group against
group, that result is by no means inevitable. A continued practice of discrim-
ination may in fact cause minority groups to coalesce, and it is possible that
this could lead to collective action with nonminority group union members.
Furthermore, docility is only one of several possible consequences of an em-
ployer's discrimination. In light of the increased militancy of minority groups
today, it seems apparent that minority groups in different areas of the
country, in different situations and at different times, react dissimilarly to
discriminatory practices.
The footnotes are omitted, but are also (with the exception of the omission by the Board of
one newspaper article) identical. Although the Board adopted the reasoning of the Note, it
did not, unfortunately, adopt the conclusions. See, 57 Geo. L. J. 1313, 1319.
67. 82 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1486 (concurring opinion). By answering far more than was
called for, and by failing to resolve the factual issues, the Board lost the issue-narrowing
benefits of case-by-case adjudication; by using the form of adjudication, the Board lost the
benefits of administrative rule making. See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule
Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L J. 571, 587-590
(1970).
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